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this is a study of how the Bahraini regime and its supporters utilized 
Facebook, twitter and other social media as a tool of surveillance 
and social control during the Bahrain uprising. Using a virtual ethnography 
conducted between February 2011 and December 2011, it establishes a typology 
of methods that describe how hegemonic forces and institutions employed social 
media to suppress both online and offline dissent. These methods are trolling, 
naming and shaming, offline factors, intelligence gathering and passive observation. 
It also discusses how these methods of control limit the ability of activists to use 
online places as spaces of representation and anti-hegemonic identity formation. 
While there is considerable research on the positive role social media plays in 
activism, this article addresses the relative paucity of literature on how hegemonic 
forces use social media to resist political change.  
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On 14 February 2011 thousands of pro-democracy activists took to the streets of Bahrain 
to demand political and social reform. While such unrest is not new, the sheer scale was 
unprecedented, as was the brutality of the crackdown, which as of 16 April 2012 has 
resulted in the death of up to 76 people (Bahrain Centre for Human Rights – BCHR, 2011) 
and the incarceration of an estimated 2929 (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
Report – BICI, 2011: 409). Despite initial support for the pro-democracy activists among 
both Sunni and Shia (Ulrichsen, 2011), the resulting crackdown has led to the increased 
polarization of Bahraini society. This is now primarily articulated along a pro-government 
versus anti-government divide, and the question ‘Are you pro- or anti-government?’ has 
become both a conversation starter and, inevitably, a conversation stopper. 
Irrespective of political stance, both government supporters and activists alike turned 
to social media and the internet to follow unfolding events. The number of Twitter users 
in Bahrain shot up (Al-Wasat, 2011), and dozens of Facebook groups materialized, the 
majority of which were posting updates, information, photos and events related to the 
revolution. Indeed, media coverage of the Arab spring tended to popularize the social media 
aspect of the struggle, with many news outlets focusing on the role of Twitter and Facebook 
in the revolutions. Much of their discourse subscribed to the ‘technological utopian’ position, 
which views social media and the internet as a positive force that democratizes information, 
reinvigorates citizens’ political engagement, encourages freedom of expression and brings 
people together (Castells, 1996; Grossman, 1995; Rheingold, 1993; Saco, 2002). 
Others were somewhat cynical, arguing that social media were merely a tool, and not 
necessarily integral to the efficacy of the revolutions as whole. Few, however, fully assumed 
the ‘technological dystopian’ or ‘Neo-Luddite’ position, which posits that technological 
developments such as the internet simply serve to ‘confound the problems of space, 
access and interaction by alienating people from each other and even themselves’ (Saco, 
2002: xv). In addition to fears that technology may actually work against integration, the 
dystopian position describes the fear that Web 2.0 technologies may be used to as part of 
the ‘informational-control continuum’, and thus shape media content through ‘propaganda, 
psychological operations, information intervention, and strategic public diplomacy’ (Bakir, 
2010: 8). The dystopian potential of technology has recently been examined by Evgeny 
Morozov (2011), who highlights the failure of cyber-utopians to predict how authoritarian 
regimes would use the internet as a tool for propaganda, surveillance and censorship.
The internet cannot be reduced to a simple dystopian versus utopian binary, 
however. Instead, one must acknowledge that it can work simultaneously as a tool of 
both empowerment and control – depending on who is using it and what objectives 
they are seeking to achieve. As Rebecca MacKinnon (2012: 27) states:
People, governments, companies, and all kinds of groups are using the 
Internet to achieve all kinds of ends, including political ones.… Pitched 
battles are currently under way over not only who controls its [the 
internet’s] future, but also over its very nature, which in turn will determine 
whom it most empowers in the long run – and who will be shut out.
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Examining the nature of these ‘pitched battles’ on a case-by-case basis is a useful 
endeavour, as temporal and contextual factors influence the manner in which the 
internet and social media are used. This statement is not an implicit rejection of 
technological determinism, but rather an acknowledgement of the importance of social 
constructivism, which is important in examining the influence of power relations and 
socio-historic factors in influencing internet use (Franklin, 2004). 
In this respect, regional case studies can help us determine the uses and outcomes of 
social media in specific cultural and political environments. How social media is used in 
Bahrain might differ markedly from how it is used in Egypt for example. 
Given that the uprising in Bahrain has not succeeded in achieving regime change, it 
makes sense to focus on how hegemonic1 forces have utilized social media to subjugate 
both dissent and dissenters in the months following 14 February. This article therefore 
focuses more on the dystopian potential of technology, and looks at how social media, 
and in particular Twitter and Facebook, have assisted the Bahraini government, 
hegemonic institutions and those representing the hegemonic order in maintaining 
their position of dominance. In particular, it examines how hegemonic forces use social 
media for the purposes of surveillance, censorship and propaganda. The results are 
arranged according to the following typology: trolling, naming and shaming, offline 
factors, intelligence gathering and passive observation. 
This article concludes by discussing how attempts to marginalize dissent in cyberspace 
mirror similar processes in urban space, which are aiming to render public spaces in 
Bahrain ahistorical, safe and generic. These processes, which range from the destruction 
of Shia mosques to the demolition of the Pearl Roundabout, all represent attempts to limit 
the ability of ‘resistance identities’ to flourish through the evisceration of both symbols 
and places (Castells, 2004). Indeed the uprising in Bahrain is also a war on symbols, 
one which is being fought in both cyberspace and urban space in an attempt to limit the 
existence of what Foucault (1986) described as heterotopias, that is, places that challenge 
‘safe space’ and allow for the flourishing of new, potentially dangerous identities that 
challenge the existing order. These heterotopias, which are spaces of crisis, deviance, 
abnormality and transformation (Kern, 2008: 105) embody a threat to the production of 
safe space if they are unregulated and uncontrolled. Political protest, which by its very 
nature poses a challenge to hegemonic order, appropriates space and in it creates crisis 
and abnormality. Thus the control of space, whether it be urban space or cyberspace, is 
fundamental to ensuring the longevity of any authoritarian regime.
space, surveillance and Control
Ever since the internet arrived in Bahrain, it has been used by political activists as a 
space for resistance. Forums such as bahrainonline.org were used to post photos of 
rallies and acts of government oppression carried out by the state security apparatus 
(Desmukh, 2010) . Since the start of the protests all of these forums have assumed 
either a pro- or anti-government identity. In a very real sense, Bahraini cyberspace has 
become segregated. This segregation is not formalized, yet the nature of interactions in 
Bahrain’s forums is very much based on political and social loyalties, and as such there 
are often implicit expectations of what one should and should not say. 
Twitter, however, is a different format, and its functionality made it an extremely 
useful tool in the Arab spring. The surge of users generated by protests on the street 
resulted in a proliferation of interactions online, the basis of which was often the 
political context that inspired the user to join. Unlike forums however, Twitter is not a 
closed community. As a result, interactions between those of opposing opinions and 
political allegiances are not restricted. On the contrary, they are common. In Bahrain, 
the resulting interactions were often characterized by volatility, hostility and aggression. 
Despite these aspects, Twitter is perhaps the most effective place for activists and 
Bahrainis to communicate in real time with both local and global actors who might be 
outside their immediate networks. This is especially important in light of the state’s tight 
control of the national media, which increased during the 2011 crackdown. Indeed, 
the regime temporarily closed down Al-Wasat, which was the only Bahraini newspaper 
that was remotely critical of the regime. Its editor Mansoor al-Jamri was charged by 
the general prosecutor for publishing false information that ‘harmed public safety and 
national interests’ (Trade Arabia, 2011). Opposition figures have also been excluded 
from the state media, which creates ‘frustration … and results in these groups resorting 
to other media outlets such as social media’ (BICI, 2011: 422). 
This inability to seek representation through official media outlets inevitably increases 
the importance of digital spaces and social media. This was especially apparent 
following the declaration of the National Safety Law in Bahrain on 15 March 2011 
(Bahrain News Agency, 2011). The law, which was the precursor to a broader 
crackdown, saw the destruction of important political and religious structures, as 
well as a clampdown on public gatherings of any sort. Examples of this include the 
demolition of the Pearl Roundabout, which was Bahrain’s ‘freedom square’ and the 
symbolic location of the uprising. In addition to this, at least 30 Shia religious structures 
were torn down. While the government claimed that the buildings were illegal, ‘five 
of them had both the requisite royal deed and building permit’ (BICI, 2011: 328). In 
all cases, the government of Bahrain ‘did not follow the requirement of the national 
law concerning the notice and issuance of a judicial order for demolition’ (BICI, 2011: 
328). Instead, it simply relied on the National Safety Law, which essentially gave carte 
blanche to carry out repressive measures in the name of national security. 
The demolitions symbolize the destruction of important representational spaces for 
Bahraini activists, many of whom are members of the country’s Shia community – a 
community that, despite being the majority, has long been marginalized politically and 
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economically (Cordesman, 1997; Khouri, 1980; Shanahan, 2008). Having said that, 
the uprising included both Sunnis and Shia, and consequently represented a major 
threat to the Al-Khalifa regime, who are never more fearful than when both sects come 
together to unilaterally oppose specific policies or measures (Khouri, 1980). Despite 
the government’s attempts to paint the uprising as a Shia-inspired, foreign-backed 
sectarian coup, the demolition of such structures seems to be indicative of sectarianism 
among Sunni hardliners in the loyalist camp. The destruction and regulation of public 
space illustrates an attempt to marginalize resistance and dissent. By regulating and 
exercising control over urban spaces the regime are eliminating important spaces in 
which identities of resistance can form.
The same is true of digital spaces, which are new frontiers for activism, and are the 
location from which people can challenge the homogenizing power of authoritarianism. 
In order to counter the threat embodied by these digital spaces, the Bahraini 
government and those representing the hegemonic order are employing tactics to 
control them. These tactics are numerous, yet can generally be seen under the umbrella 
of ‘surveillance’, for they are all attempts to instil normative and acceptable repertoires 
of behaviour through both observation and creating a fear of observation. 
surveillance versus sousveillance 
Surveillance is the process by which organizations and governments observe 
individuals or groups of individuals. It is an asymmetric process that affords power to 
the observer but not the observed, and is therefore a process by which the surveiller 
asserts his domination over the surveilled. The means by which an organization 
conducts surveillance is multifaceted, yet technological developments have facilitated 
the speed and efficacy of the process, allowing for more efficient and pervasive 
observation. Indeed, the rise of what Jan van Dijk (1991) first termed the ‘Network 
Society’ has given both organizations and the state unprecedented opportunities to 
carry out surveillance. As Lyon (2001) argues, the information society is also the 
surveillance society. 
The historical role of technology in surveillance is perhaps most famously illustrated 
by Bentham’s Panopticon, a buildings whose geometry allowed a prison guard to 
watch the inmates without them knowing. Timothy Mitchell (1991: x) describes the 
Panopticon as the ‘institution in which the use of coercion and commands to control a 
population was replaced by the partitioning of space, the isolation of individuals, and 
their systematic yet unseen surveillance’. Mitchell’s (1991) work on Egypt draws heavily 
on the work of Michel Foucault, who outlined the importance of the power differential 
within the context of the ‘unseen’. Ben and Marthalee Barton (1993) summarize 
Foucault’s (1983) argument, stating that the ‘asymmetry of seeing-without-being-
seen is, in fact, the very essence of power’, and the ‘power to dominate rests on the 
differential possession of knowledge’. As well stressing the importance of asymmetry, 
Foucault states that: ‘[the] major effect of the Panopticon is to induce in the inmate a 
state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of 
power’ (1977: 201). He adds that surveillance should be ‘permanent in its effects, 
even if it is discontinuous in its action’ (1977: 201). In other words, it is not just being 
watched that is enough to induce obedience to authority, but rather the possibility of 
being watched. 
An example of such an apparatus could be seen in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, where 
a mosque with an unusually high minaret was built in order to keep track of the Shia 
in Karbala (Bakir, 2010, 17). The Hassan mosque, itself a modern-day Panopticon, 
functioned alongside a highly repressive state intelligence apparatus (mukhabarat), 
which is a common presence in the majority of Middle Eastern countries. Bahrain 
is no exception and, although it is a liberal state by regional standards with fewer 
restrictions on internet access (Hofheinz, 2007: 60), it still suffers from many of the 
same repressive measures that serve to limit both dissent and political mobilization. 
Even before 14 February Bahrain had blocked websites deemed to be politically 
controversial and arrested on a number of occasions the well-known blogger Ali 
Abdulemam (Desmukh, 2010). 
This censorship indicates the threat that new technologies pose to regimes around 
the world. They must therefore adopt new methods of observation, ones that 
preferably permit coercion with minimal resort to violence. While such observation 
was traditionally carried out via the naked eye, ‘surveillance techniques have 
increasingly become embedded in technology’ (Mann et al., 2003). Oscar Gandy 
(1993) and Mark Poster (1990) argue that the growth of information technology 
and databases has led to an asymmetrical monitoring of behaviour. This surveillance 
allows particular organizations, whether they be corporate or bureaucratic to ‘not 
only commodify the personal information of those observed, but also use such 
information to inform practices of social control and discrimination’ (Humphreys, 
2011: 576). Facebook and Twitter are therefore a potential opportunity for 
organizations to extract information which can be used to further the agenda of the 
particular institutional body collecting the data. 
So, just as the Panopticon allowed the asymmetric observation of a prison’s inmates, 
the modern-day neo-Panopticon (Mann et al., 2003: 332) can be seen as the use of 
observational technologies to discourage certain forms of behaviour in a wide range 
of places, from malls to high streets, to forums and social media. While the essence of 
this surveillance is based on the fact that it is asymmetrical, the use of new technologies 
by individuals to observe those in authority represents a sort of inverse Panopticon, one 
where citizens can challenge the government’s monopoly on information (2003: 333). 
This idea is described as ‘sousveillance’, ‘from the French words for ‘sous’ (below) 
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and ‘veiller’ to watch’ (2003, 332). ‘Sousveillance’, itself a form of ‘reflectionism’, is a 
term invented by Mann (1998: 93–102) to describe the process of using technologies 
to confront organizations by documenting their actions or the consequences of their 
actions. In other words, it gives those who are observed the power to become the 
observer, and the power to resist the authority of the state. Mann also discusses the 
idea of ‘personal sousveillance’, which is the use of technology such as social media to 
document one’s own day-to-day experience. An example of this might include Bahraini 
activists who photographed themselves at the Pearl Roundabout. However, such 
seemingly banal ‘personal sousveillance’ can be re-appropriated by the regime and 
its supporters and used as part of its own surveillance apparatus (Bakir, 2010; Mann, 
2002; Mann et al., 2003). This is nowhere more evident than in Bahrain, where the 
increasing polarization of society has resulted in citizens using social media as a tool of 
peer-to-peer to surveillance. 
methods
In order to assess how hegemonic forces are attempting to use social media as a tool 
of surveillance and social control, a virtual ethnography was carried out. A virtual 
ethnography is similar to a traditional ethnography and can: 
involve the ethnographer participating, overtly or covertly in people’s 
daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, 
listening to what is said, asking questions – in fact, collecting whatever 
data are available to throw light on the issues that are the focus of the 
research. (Hine, 2008: 259) 
Doing this on ‘social media’ is not an easy task and, for months, involved the daily 
monitoring of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube (the subjects of the study). Integral to 
this virtual ethnography was Twitter, which served as both a locus of interactions and 
conduit of vital information that led to relevant news, videos and images. Conducting 
this virtual ethnography moved beyond just ‘lurking’, and very much involved becoming 
part of Bahrain’s online community. In some ways this was for the sake of establishing 
trust and credibility, but it was also an inevitable part of online activism, of which I have 
become a part. 
The importance of building trust within what can only loosely be termed a Twitter 
‘community’ cannot be overstated, for it formed the basis of establishing relationships 
that led to interviews, discussions and chats. It was also these relationships that 
developed through the virtual ethnography that formed the basis of investigative 
collaborations that were important in identifying potential surveillance tactics used by 
hegemonic forces. This is particularly true of the information regarding the company 
Olton and Liliane Khalil, both of which will be discussed later. Through a combination 
of observation, participation and interviews spanning an 11-month period (February 
2011–December 2011), it was possible to gain a deeper insight into the potential 
role of social media as tools of surveillance and social control. The most notable 
factors highlighted have been categorized as trolling, naming and shaming, passive 
observation, intelligence gathering and offline factors. 
The ethical considerations for this research are, of course, voluminous: not only in 
the sense that people in Bahrain are fearful of the potential ramifications of speaking 
out about politically sensitive issues, but also because this research is fundamentally 
about surveillance and privacy. Indeed, Marc Smith (1999: 211) makes a point about 
new technologies that is still pertinent today, and asks if the analysis of such data is 
simply the extension of the means of surveillance that is already a disturbing trend in 
the information age. In his succinct paraphrasing of Mark Poster, Smith (1999: 211) 
suggests that observing such interactions can ‘uncover social spaces, subjecting them to 
a kind of Panoptic surveillance’. 
While it impossible to allay all of these concerns, measures have been taken to 
preserve the privacy of those involved. All information received in confidence has 
been anonymized and only included with the express consent of those who provided 
it. Furthermore, information disclosed in private has only been accepted from 
those whose identity I have verified. This stems from what is perceived to be a huge 
proliferation in anonymous accounts, the implications of which will be discussed in 
the findings of this study. 
Findings 
Trolling or Flaming
Broadly speaking, trolling can be defined as a form of aggressive internet 
communication where people using anonymous accounts engage in abusive behaviour 
towards other users. It is a form of what MacKinnon (2012) calls ‘cyber-harassment’, 
and can vary in severity, ranging from provocative comments to outright bullying. 
Contrary to Yochai Benkler’s (2006: 374) suggestion that ‘flame wars’2 might dissipate 
as people become more familiar with new technologies, they have shown little sign of 
abating in Bahrain. 
Trolling in Bahrain ranges from spiteful personal comments to death threats. For 
example, one Twitter user feared for the safety of her child when an anonymous troll 
started tweeting about how he (the troll) knew where the child went to school. He even 
named the school and gave details of its layout and location. Another activist reported 
how trolls created five parody accounts, all of which were dedicated to ridiculing her. 
In an attempt to rectify this, the victim had to send to Twitter on each occasion proof of 
identity to get rid of the anonymous accounts. Tiring of this, Twitter eventually suggested 
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she just tweet under a separate or anonymous identity, essentially admitting defeat at 
the hands of the troll(s). 
Bahrain’s Twitter trolls have acquired such a reputation that they have prompted 
many international journalists or activists reporting on Bahrain to write/blog about 
them, including Jillian York, (2011) David Goodman (2011) and Brian Dooley (2011). 
Following the release of the BICI report on 23 November 2011, Al-Jazeera reporter 
Gregg Carlstrom tweeted:  ‘Bahrain has by far the hardest-working Twitter trolls of any 
country I’ve reported on’.3 Global Voices editor for the Middle East and North Africa 
Amira Al Hussaini tweeted:4  ‘Yawn: cyberbullying = censorship! Welcome to the new 
era of freedom in #Bahrain’. A number of people told me how trolling stopped them 
from tweeting politics, with one user stating: 
Don’t know how long Marc, my heart is heavy. Even my moderate views get attacked 
by trolls.
Few people who engage in trolling have accounts that reveal their true identity, and 
it is precisely this anonymity that makes many people suspicious. There are perhaps 
thousands of anonymous accounts, all of which have very few followers, and usually 
have an avatar that symbolizes their support for the regime (such as a picture of one of 
the Royal Family). Despite the fact that the regime enjoys some degree of legitimacy in 
Bahrain, there is a belief that many of these accounts are created by the security forces 
or PR companies to bully activists and give the illusion of widespread support for the 
government (Halvorssen, 2011). 
Given that the US military is developing software that will allow it to ‘secretly 
manipulate social media sites by using fake online personas to influence internet 
conversations and spread pro-American propaganda’ (Fielding and Cobain, 2011), 
it comes as no surprise that the private sector might seek to profit from it. Indeed, it 
was revealed that BGR Gabara, a British PR firm reportedly working for the Bahraini 
government, planned to organize a ‘Twitter campaign’ on behalf of Kazakh children 
(Newman and Wright, 2011). This exacerbated fears that they were conducting similar 
operations in Bahrain. 
What these findings illustrate is that trolling can result in people changing their 
tweeting habits. A number of people interviewed said how they were less likely to tweet 
anything against the regime after being trolled. Others changed their Twitter privacy 
settings so that their tweets would not be seen by the global public. This demonstrates 
how hegemonic forces can use social media to influence the flow of anti-government 
rhetoric, thus contributing to the state’s censorship apparatus Dissuading people from 
tweeting also creates an informational vacuum, one that can then be filled with pro-
regime propaganda/PR. 
Name and Shame 
Perhaps one of the most pernicious things to come out of the uprising is the Hareghum 
Twitter account. Hareghum, which literally means ‘the one that burns them’, is a self-
proclaimed defender of Bahrain, and spends his days disclosing information about 
traitors in Bahrain. This includes posting photos of people seen at anti-government 
rallies, circling their faces, disclosing their addresses, their places of work and their 
phone numbers . Unfortunately, the account has achieved such notoriety that it has 
become well known in Bahrain. An example of his impact was revealed to me by one 
informant, who said: 
My friend she left the country after her husband who works in a bank 
became a target of this 7araghum [sic]. I don’t think she’ll ever come back.
While many have tried to unveil Hareghum’s identity, no one has been successful. It is 
believed to be a number of people taking it in turns to manage the account. Hareghum 
has become an institution in itself in Bahrain, with people using it both to ‘report’ 
suspected ‘traitors’, and also to find information about ‘traitors’. One such example 
was provided by someone whose father used to have a high position in a Bahraini 
company. He was contacted by someone who had information about a potential 
‘traitor’ working in the company. 
this guy sends a message to my Dad pasted from Hareghum about 
an [insert company name] employee.… He was sending it to my dad 
because my dad is still well connected, so can make things happen.… 
So he was telling my dad ‘Do the needful’ (i.e. get him fired).
The climate of fear that existed when this message was sent should not be 
underestimated, for it was a time when thousands of Bahrainis were being fired from 
work for taking in part in strikes, even though the strikes were ‘within the permissible 
bounds of the law’ (BICI, 2011: 420).
Prior to Hareghum, there were other examples of people with anonymous Twitter 
accounts receiving messages disclosing their name and identity. (e.g. imagine you 
had gone to great lengths to protect your identity on Twitter and then someone you 
don’t know contacts you and tells you your name, phone number and address). On 
describing Hareghum, the Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
(2011) stated:
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In some cases, a photograph of a protester was posted with a comment 
asking for the name of the person, and other Twitter users then posted 
the requested information. Witnesses reported to the Commission that 
persons who had been named or identified by Harghum [sic] would then 
avoid sleeping at their home address for fear of an attack. Harghum 
[sic] also allegedly advertised a MoI [Ministry of the Interior] ‘hotline’, 
which people could call in order to report on persons engaged in anti-
government activity. (BICI, 2011, 381)
The Harghum [sic] Twitter account targeted anti-government protesters 
and even disclosed their whereabouts and personal details. Harghum 
[sic] openly harassed, threatened and defamed certain individuals, 
and in some cases placed them in immediate danger. The Commission 
considers such harassment to be a violation of a person’s right to 
privacy while also amounting to hate speech and incitement to violence. 
(BICI, 2011: 391)
As of November 2012, the government have done nothing about the account, even 
though the Commission stated that Hareghum ‘produced material that international law 
requires to be prohibited and which is in fact prohibited under Bahrain law’. It is interesting 
to note that similar ‘name and shame’ groups existed on Facebook (al-Qassemi, 2011; 
Facebook ‘used to hunt down Bahrain dissidents’, 2011; Reuters, 2011), yet it is easier 
to have Facebook remove these groups. Twitter, on the other hand, makes it hard to 
remove such groups unless they are reported for spam. What this has led to is many pro-
government supporters leading campaigns where they get people to report human rights 
activists such as Nabeel Rajab and Maryam al-Khawaja for spam. Despite Facebook’s 
more sympathetic policy in getting rid of such groups, it was reportedly used to identify the 
workplace and home of 20-year-old poet Ayat al-Qurmezi, who angered authorities by 
reading out a poem that criticized King Hamad. Visitors to this Facebook page were told to 
write the ‘traitor’s name and work place’. Soon afterwards masked men arrested her (Al-
Jazeera English, 2011; Facebook ‘used to hunt down Bahrain dissidents’, 2011). 
Offline Factors
‘Offline factors’ refers to a number of pressures that do not necessarily occur online, 
but still work to encourage self-censorship by discouraging  people from using social 
media. In March a photo of ‘web terrorists’5 was circulated on Twitter. This included 
Manaf al-Muhandis, Mahmood Yousif and Mohammed Maskati – all prominent Twitter 
users or bloggers who were subsequently arrested (Reporters without Borders, 2011). 
They were all detained for varying lengths of time, and none of them tweeted anything 
controversial or very political for a considerable time following their release. Prominent 
blogger Ali Abdulemam, who is currently believed to be in hiding, was sentenced in 
absentia to 15 years in prison for ‘spreading false information and trying to subvert 
the regime’. In addition to this, blogger Zakariya Rashid Hassan Al Asheri was tortured 
to death in prison on 9 April 2011 (BICI, 2011: 238). As a result of the above arrests, 
important representatives of the activist community disappeared, further diminishing the 
visibility of credible online activism, and also prompting much fear among other online 
activists, who were far more reluctant to tweet anything critical of the regime. The 
death of Zakariya also resulted in Reporters without Borders putting Bahrain on a list of 
‘enemies of the internet’ (BBC, 2012). Other offline factors include family pressure not 
to use social media (particularly Twitter), and widespread fear that the government is 
able to hack accounts and access personal information. One informant stated:
I used to tweet but then when some of my friends got arrested my father 
sat me down and gave me a looong [sic] talk, guilting me into deleting 
all my tweets.
The fact that the Tunisians used phishing techniques to obtain the Facebook account 
details of political activists strengthened this anxiety (Ryan, 2011). 
Intelligence Gathering
Other, perhaps more sinister elements faced by activists are the clandestine operations 
undertaken by companies such as Olton, a UK-based intelligence-gathering/PR firm that 
has a contract with the Bahrain Economic Development Board. One activist told me:
There’s this British company called Olton. I don’t know exactly what they 
do except that they employ Bahrainis loyal to the regime to do something 
with social media. The person recruiting them is ex-UK military. 
Despite the government of Bahrain’s Tender Board’s description of Olton’s work being 
‘to develop an electronic system to track international media’, one of their employees 
is known to have worked for the Ministry of the Interior, the body responsible for 
Bahrain’s security forces (Desmukh, 2011a). Furthermore, Olton was at the IDEX Arms 
Fair in Abu Dhabi where the company was reported to be marketing its ‘web-trawling’ 
software as something that could head off unrest in the Middle East. It would do this 
through monitoring social media in order to identify ringleaders (Desmukh, 2011a). 
Fears that Twitter and Facebook were being monitored were further exacerbated 
after at least 47 students were dismissed from Bahrain Polytechnic for ‘participating 
in unlicensed gatherings and marches’. This was ‘based on evidence mostly obtained 
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from social media pages like Facebook’ (Yasin, 2011) Some were dismissed for simply 
‘liking’ an anti-government post on Facebook (Yasin, 2011). Many reported that they 
were dismissed after authorities showed them printouts of their Facebook pages. 
Blurring this line between propaganda, PR, ‘data-mining’ and intelligence gathering was 
‘Liliane Khalil’, a hoax journalist who used blogs, Twitter and email to build up a convincing 
online persona. Although she had claimed to be the US editor of a pro-government blog 
called the Bahrain Independent, an investigation revealed that she was a hoax (Jones, 
2011). Although Liliane Khalil’s exact identity remains unknown, there is evidence that links 
her to Task Consultancy, a Bahraini company that was paid by the Bahraini government to 
formulate a PR plan (Desmukh, 2011b). Liliane Khalil also interviewed a number of activists 
on the understanding that she wanted to hear ‘their side of the story’. However, several of 
those interviewed reported that she passed on their personal information to a pro-regime 
Twitter user – who then broadcast it on Twitter stating that the interviewees were traitors. 
‘Passive’ Observation 
In anticipation of the protests, the Bahraini government created a number of Twitter 
accounts, most notably one for the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) – the body responsible 
for Bahrain’s security forces. While the MoI’s account tended to publish news without 
interacting with other people, this did not stop people from interacting with the MoI. 
Between the months of February and April, it was common for pro-regime supporters to 
use Twitter to ‘report’ people they thought were traitors to the MoI. The following tweet 
is an example of this: 
@hussainm89 Dear @moi_bahrain can you please arrest this MOFO 
Hussain Mirza born 1989, he is a traitor 
Although it is doubtful that the ministry takes such complaints seriously, the impact that 
the potential threat of surveillance has is very real, as someone once made clear.
Be careful Marc. Don’t argue a lot. A lot of people from Moi on Twitter. 
And if you mention the king justice etc, you might be unable to enter the 
country. Just be careful plz.
 
discussion 
For activists, using social media as a tool for activism or representation is fraught with 
danger. The tactics adopted by hegemonic forces in Bahrain contributed to a climate of 
fear and distrust, one that disrupted social media space by assimilating it as part of the 
regime’s surveillance apparatus. Trolling, for example, is not only a form of social control 
that exercises its power through intimidation, but also serves as a reminder that one’s 
behaviour is always being watched, and that any potential dissent will never be without 
fear of observation. Even the mere presence of an MoI Twitter account was enough to 
regulate some people’s behaviour by reminding them that they were being monitored. 
The incarceration of key online activists also reminded Bahrainis of the potential costs of 
utilizing social media for dissent, and thus asserted that the transgression of a certain set 
of normative behaviours (in this case acquiescence ) would not be tolerated. 
The impact in Bahrain of trolling and naming and shaming illustrates the dangers 
of these forms of ‘cyber-vigilantism’, which will only become more detrimental as 
social cohesion in Bahrain is further eroded. Hareghum is a particular worry, for it has 
become a quasi-official institution, one whose continued existence and endorsement 
by some supporters of the regime represents tacit support of its utility as a method of 
social control. Just as plain-clothes thugs operate alongside the police in suppressing 
protests, accounts like Hareghum’s worked alongside the regime’s intelligence-gathering 
apparatus, appropriating citizens’ ‘personal sousveillance’ and using it to persecute, 
vilify and threaten. Although Hareghum’s identity still remains unknown, the opaque 
way in which the regime has so far conducted the crackdown, and the blurring of 
lines between law enforcement and state-endorsed vigilantism have heightened the 
suspicions of activists, many of whom believe that Hareghum actually operates with MoI 
approval. Whether or not this is the case is in many ways, irrelevant. This is because 
perception plays a fundamental role in surveillance – for what we perceive and what 
is actual form the underlying mechanism of the Panopticon, which seeks not only to 
watch, but to make people believe they are being watched. 
Another alarming trend is the clandestine role played by predominantly western PR and 
security firms, many of which are ‘exploiting the burgeoning but unregulated surveillance 
market’ (Doward and Lewis, 2012). Bahrain also enlists the services of companies like 
Nokia Siemens, whose SMS monitoring technology was used by the state’s security 
apparatus to intercept the communications of suspected dissidents (Silver and Elgin, 2011) 
. Olton, the British company offering expertise in social media, also offers a ‘reputation 
management’ service. This aims to promote ‘positive’ online commentary while ‘mitigating 
the negative’ (Olton, 2012). The fact it is also an ‘intelligence-gathering’ company has 
serious implications for freedom of speech. As I have stated elsewhere: 
The threat posed by unscrupulous PR companies to freedom of speech 
should not be underestimated. It is bad enough that they distort the public 
sphere in exchange for money, yet it is the rise of companies like Olton 
that is the most alarming, for when does intelligence gathering become 
evidence gathering? Furthermore, when does ‘reputation management’ 
involve facilitating the silencing of those narratives that oppose the 
desired rhetoric of the paying client? (2012)
The recent revelation that that British PR firm Bell Pottinger was offering to help 
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companies hijack citizen petitions in order to influence European Union law raises 
questions about a similar incident that occurred in Bahrain last year (Rawlinson, 2012). 
This involved the circulation of a petition on Twitter that claimed to be a proposal listing 
the demands of Bahrain’s youth for an upcoming reconciliation initiative called the 
National Dialogue. Over a thousand people signed it, though many of the signatories 
were anonymous, sock-puppet accounts. The following day the National Unity 
Gathering (Bahrain’s new pro-government political party) used the petition as a basis 
for determining what Bahraini youth wanted (unsurprisingly, they did not want political 
change – just security) (Gulf Daily News, 2011). The notion that anonymous online 
accounts might be rubber-stamping policies in order to give them a veneer of democratic 
legitimacy illustrates the ease with which social media can be used to manufacture 
consent. Although this might seem like the stuff of Orwellian fantasy, one must not 
underestimate the dangers of a growing surveillance industry, one that capitalizes on the 
desire of authoritarian regimes around the world to monitor, control and suppress dissent. 
Conclusion 
Through trolling, naming and shaming, ‘passive’ observation, intelligence gathering 
and offline factors, the hegemonic order is able to utilize social media in a manner 
that serves its own interests. Specifically, it helps the government and its supporters 
to preserve the status quo through extending the means by which they conduct 
surveillance. Such methods are attempts to impose normative forms of behaviour in 
spaces that allow for the performance of identities that challenge the hegemonic order. 
These spaces, which include Shia religious structures, the Pearl Roundabout and social 
media, all represent what Foucault (1986) described as heterotopias, that is, places 
that challenge ‘safe space’ and allow for the flourishing of resistance identities that 
challenge the hegemonic order. This capacity of social media to function as a space 
of resistance did not go uncontested in Bahrain, and hegemonic forces also used it to 
enhance and ‘mobilise identities to facilitate the extraction of resources from the society 
to confront the external (and in Bahrain’s case, internal) threat’ (Saideman, 2002: 
170). So while social media allows activists to ‘overcome the powerlessness of their 
solitary despair … and fight the powers that be by identifying the networks that are’, 
it also allows hegemonic forces to resist change (Castells, 2009: 431). Furthermore, 
Bahrain illustrates how it is not simply faceless authoritarian regimes that resist political 
change, but citizens too, especially those who benefit both economically and socially 
from maintaining the status quo. Indeed, just as those advocating political change can 
use social media to create networks of resistance, those representing the hegemonic 
order can mobilize their own networks of domination.
Perhaps one of the saddest aspects of all this was how information shared amid a 
climate of optimism, such as photos of peaceful protesters at the Pearl Roundabout, was 
re-appropriated by the likes of Hareghum and re-framed within a context of treachery, 
terrorism and betrayal. Such abuses of social media not only remind Bahrainis of the 
potential costs of sharing information publicly but also demonstrate how trust is an 
increasingly scarce commodity. The nature of this breakdown of trust was nowhere 
more evident than on Facebook, and numerous interviewees shared stories of how they 
purged their ‘friend lists’ through both anger at their newly developed political outlook, 
and through fear that that person might gain access to potentially ‘incriminating’ photos 
or information. The erosion of trust is itself a crucial part of the effects of surveillance, 
for the inability to trust others promotes increased isolation of the individual, which can 
work against social cohesion and discourage the formation of strong networks that may 
potentially pose a threat to the incumbent order. 
Although it must be emphasized that these negative effects are very real, they by 
no means undermine the importance of social media as a tool for sousveillance. It is 
an instrument of both  empowerment and control, yet the extent to which it functions 
as either depends very much on the cultural, geopolitical, technological and temporal 
context in which it is being used. The role of social media is ambivalent, and although 
it has been an incredibly positive force in Bahrain, documenting its successes would 
necessitate a separate article. 
As it stands, pro-democracy activists still face a great many obstacles when it comes 
to finding spaces from which to represent themselves. The brutal daily crackdowns 
in the villages, the destruction of the Pearl Roundabout, the demolition of mosques 
all represent attempts to control space and render it ahistorical, conformist and 
safe. For the regime, these are all spaces of crisis, transformation and change, or 
heterotopias. Social media are no different, and can also be regulated and controlled. 
As the struggle for democracy continues in urban space, so does it in cyberspace. 
In many ways, the battle is for cyberspace, for it is a battle between the principles of 
empowerment and control, the continuation of which underlines the argument that 
social media are a tool of both emancipation and repression. 
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the aim of this article is to explore a renewed and radical ‘media 
culture’ that has developed in the extraordinary conditions of the 
syrian revolution. The article quickly dismisses the focus on the technology and 
platforms while using small-scale ethnography to examine social networking sites like 
Facebook and to underscore the diversity of content being produced by Syrians.  It 
notes how the Syrian media revolution is clearly well under way and how radical, 
alternative forms of media production are flourishing.  
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